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GATT Dispute Settlements: A New
Beginning in International and
U.S. Trade Law
Donald E. deKieffer*
Although the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)'
has been in existence for over two decades, a workable system has only
recently developed for resolving disputes between contracting parties.
Since its inception, the GATT has been designed to promote the grad-
ual dissolution of trade barriers between the major mercantile countries
of the world.2 In its early years, the GATT approached this ambitious
goal solely through irregular negotiating "rounds" at which the Con-
tracting Parties (the nations signatory to the GATT) mutually agreed to
reduce their tariff barriers. There was little attempt to develop an effec-
tive enforcement mechanism to monitor the respective obligations un-
dertaken by the contracting parties.
Although rudimentary dispute settlement procedures were incor-
porated from the very earliest drafts of the GATT, the implementation
of these procedures was desultory at best. Contracting parties relied
upon good faith amongst their trading partners and regarded the
GATT itself as being self-enforcing. As membership in GATT ex-
* Partner, deKieffer, Berg & Creskoff, Washington, D.C.; member District of Columbia Bar;,
B.A., 1968, University of Colorado; J.D., 1971, Georgetown University.
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. GAT has been modified in
several respects since 1947. The current version of the agreement is contained in 4 GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969).
2 For a thorough discussion of the history of the General Agreement and a description of the
international organization, also known as "the GATT," which administers the Agreement, see
generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAT (1969); K. DAM, THE GAIT-
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); R. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975).
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panded beyond the major mercantile countries, however, and the de-
mands of the Less Developed Countries (LDC's) intensified for
recognition of their development needs and thus for trade preferences
and protection 3 a three-way conflict developed between GATT's tradi-
tional objective of tariff reduction, the desire of the LDC's for prefer-
ence and protection, and the corresponding desire of the developed
countries to protect themselves from what they perceived as unfair
practices in international trade. Thus, as the GATT became increas-
ingly sophisticated4 and imposed its tariff-cutting objective more force-
fully upon a greater and more diverse number of contracting parties,
the need for a more thorough dispute settlement procedure became ob-
vious.
The most recent round of trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round,
5
has given the GATT dispute settlement function a new and added im-
portance. Not only have the procedures for dispute settlement
changed, but the type of issues which are likely to be considered by the
dispute settlement panels has been significantly expanded. The Tokyo
Round laid down new authority for the GATT to resolve disagree-
ments among its members. The degree to which this new authority is
effective may well govern the patterns of international trade for the
next five to ten years.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE TOKYO ROUND
The first step in the GATT dispute settlement process consists of
consultations concerning alleged GATT violations6 among the coun-
3 See generally Meier, The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations andthe Developing
Countries, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 239 (1980).
4 The first six negotiating rounds were concerned primarily with tariff reductions. See gener-
ally R. HUDEC, supra note 2. While tariff reductions were attained in the latest round, the Tokyo
Round, its principal objective was the reduction or harmonization of non-tariff barriers. S. REP.
No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1979] 6A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9.
5 For a discussion of some of the history of the Tokyo Round see R. BALDWIN, THE MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: TOWARD GREATER LIBERALIZATION (1979). For the text of the
agreements concluded at the Tokyo Round, see AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, pt. 1, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 7 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. Doc. No. 153]. For a discussion of the agreements and their expected
impact on international trade see Symposium on the Multilateral Trade Agreements (pt. 1-2), 11
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1257-1526 (1979), 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1-334 (1980); (Sympo-
sium), 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145-290 (1980).
6 The types of trade practices that may constitute violations of the GATT are as varied as the
ingenuity of traders seeking commercial advantages. Aside from the traditional mechanisms of
dumping and subsidization which are addressed by the International Antidumping and Subsidies
Codes, infra note 10, a plethora of acts can trigger complaints to the GATT. These range from
imposition of import restrictions without the requisite showing that the exporting country has
engaged in any "unfair" pricing practices, to more sophisticated practices of trade diversion. For
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tries party to a dispute.7 Matters not settled through consultations may
be referred to the GATT Council, the general steering body of the Con-
tracting Parties, which can convene either a small panel of impartial
experts or a larger working party of national representatives to review
the case at hand. If the "panel of conciliation" or working party does
not mediate an amicable settlement, the group's recommendations of
fact and law are submitted to the Council, which reviews the group's
decision and either provides further guidance to the parties in mediat-
ing an amicable settlement, or makes a ruling on the dispute. The Con-
tracting Parties may authorize trade retaliation against recalcitrant
offending parties if the Contracting Parties consider the circumstances
to be serious enough.8
Prior to 1980, the dispute settlement procedures were more form
than substance. Countries could, and did, request the GATT to inter-
vene in cases where they felt they had been wronged by another mem-
ber's policies. The substantive rules of international behavior,
however, were so poorly defined by the GATT itself that few dispu-
tants wanted to take a chance on permitting an international panel to
make what would have amounted to ad hoc international law.
Within the panels themselves, determinations on sensitive issues
were avoided. The panelists justifiably felt that the GATT would lose
credibility if the panels openly challenged major economic policies of
the larger trading nations. Although the deliberations of the GATT
panels are of interest to students of international trade and economics,
they are not benchmarks of jurisprudence. Except with respect to high-
ly technical issues, adjudicative GATT dispute settlement had been in-
effective, particularly in the years preceding the Kennedy Round.'
example, Country A, fearful of Country B's countervailing duty laws, does not subsidize exports
to Country C. The low price of A's products in C's market drives down the volume of B's exports
to C. Such trade diversion behavior may not be reachable under the Subsidies Code, infra note
10, but clearly is a policy which could be brought to GATT dispute settlement.
Similarly, most countries maintain a variety of non-tariff barriers (NTB's) to trade, many of
which are allegedly designed to promote social or political rather than economic objectives. Many
such NTB's are manifestly discriminatory and can certainly be challenged in the GATT. For
example, if under the guise of consumer safety, Country A insists that consumer electric products
sold in its jurisdiction be tested within its borders, this would certainly be a NTB cognizable under
the GATT, particularly if such restrictions were put in place after the Tokyo Round.
7 GATT, supra note 1, art. XXII provides (1) that each contracting party "shall afford ade-
quate opportunity for consultation regarding representations by another party ... ," and (2) that
the Contracting Parties may be requested by any contracting party to consult with any other con-
tracting party or parties regarding any matter.
8 GATT, supra note I, art. XXIII(2).
9 In addition to a lack of substantive rules, discouraging submission of controversies to
GATT, and the panelists' practice of avoiding controversy, other reasons advanced for nations'
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The reluctance of countries during this period to submit substan-
tial questions to panels, and the practice of the panels themselves in
ducking controversy as often as possible, actually reflected one of the
strengths of the GATT as well as one of its weaknesses. The GATT as
a multilateral treaty was designed to be effectively self-executing. All
the major trading nations realized it was in their long-term self-interest
to have a rational mechanism governing international commerce. To
the extent this perception was shared, the enforcement mechanism was
of secondary importance.
While this concept was hardly comforting to judicially-oriented
scholars, it was a milestone in international law and international rela-
tions. Coercion by the Contracting Parties of an offending GATT sig-
natory, even if agreed upon in advance and implemented only in
accordance with elaborate procedures for ensuring due process and
fairness, was simply too much to expect at the inception of the GATT.
After almost three decades of development, however, the GATT con-
cept has matured to the point where more formalized methods of dis-
pute settlement have become necessary.
THE TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATIONS
Just as the loosely structured dispute settlement system of the
1960's and 1970's was appropriate for the Dillon and Kennedy Round
Multilateral Trade Agreements, a new structure was necessary to give
credibility to the new technical codes agreed to in the Tokyo Round.' 0
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the codes agreed to in the
reluctance to use the dispute settlement procedures include: (1) the process is subject to both
inordinate delays and to political pressures; (2) the role of panels is poorly defined; (3) the GATT
lacks the administrative personnel and resources needed to conduct adequate investigations; (4)
the implementation phases of the procedure are loose and poorly defined. See Jackson, The Birth
of the G.47T-MTN Systen" .4 Constitutional Appraisal, 12 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 21, 41-43
(1980); See also Graham, Reformning the International Trading Systemn The Tokyo Round Negotia-
tions in the Final Stage, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 28-30 (1979); Roschke, The G.4777 Problems
and Prospects, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 85 (1977).
10 The major code agreed to in the Tokyo Round, which is juridically separate from the Gen-
eral Agreement, includes:
(1) Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/299/Rev. I, reprintedin H.R. Doc. No.
153, supra note 5, at 7 [hereinafter cited as Customs Valuation Code];
(2) Agreement on Government Procurement, done Apr. 11, 1979, GATT Doc.
MTN/NTM/W/21 I/Rev. 2, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra note 5, at 69;
(3) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (known as the Standards Code), done March
29, 1979, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev. 5, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra note 5,
at 211;
(4) Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
G,4 TT Dispute Settlements
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latest round of negotiations, both in terms of their actual substantive
content and as evidencing a further maturation of international com-
mercial practice. While some might consider the reduction of tariff
barriers as one of the great accomplishments of the Tokyo Round, such
reductions were merely a continuation of the process which engendered
the GATT in the first place. Of far more lasting consequence was the
Contracting Parties' acceptance of reductions in non-tariff barriers.
Even more novel was the approach adopted to deal with these issues.
Rather than achieve reductions in non-tariff barriers through the strict
mathematical formulae which had characterized the mutual tariff re-
ductions of the Tokyo Round, negotiators established a system of pro-
cedures to judge the practices of GATT members against an absolute
standard of conduct without specific reference to the current policies of
any given nation. Some commentators contend there was nothing new
in all this because the GATT itself had specified standards of conduct
for its members since its inception. 1 I venture to suggest, however,
that the general rules adopted at the GATT's founding, including such
allegedly specific provisions as Article XIX, 12 were, and remain, so
vague as to defy consistent judicial interpretation. To those who ad-
here to an adverse analysis, I merely point to the fact that the negotia-
tors themselves cited the vagueness of the GATT provisions as one of
the justifications for adopting the Subsidies Code.'
3
In Geneva, both Third World and developed countries argued that
the advantages of such specific standards of conduct could be offset by
the acrimony which would surely follow in dispute settlement. 14 The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/236,
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra note 5, at 259 [hereinafter cited as Subsidies Code];
(5) Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, done Apr. 9, 1979, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/232, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153,
supra note 5, at 311 [hereinafter cited as International Antidumping Code].
II See The Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Dispute Settlement [1980] PROCEEDINGS AM. Soc.
INT'L L. 140 (panel discussion with participation of Michael Gadbow, Thomas R. Graham, Rob-
ert E. Herzstein, Robert E. Hudec, John H. Jackson, and the author).
12 GATT, supra note 1, art. XIX Under certain conditions, Article XIX permits an importing
nation to suspend partially or entirely an obligation toward a contracting party in order to prevent
or remedy serious injury to its domestic producers resulting from unforseen developments. This
right to "escape clause" reliefis embodied in U.S. domestic legislation in § 201 of the Trade Act of
1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1980).
13 See generally Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade, 7 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 327, 343-50 (1975).
14 See (Conference), Reform ofthe International Trading System, 84 F.R.D. 590, 592 (1980)
(statement of Mr. Greenwald, Assistant General Counsel at USTR, indicating greatest resistance
to change in dispute settlement process was on part of the Europeans and Japanese). Though the
latest round of multilateral trade negotiations opened in 1973 with a meeting in Tokyo, the Tokyo
Round was actually held in Geneva.
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institutionalization of formal and specific standards, it was alleged,
would open the gates to a flood of GATT litigation. Some countries
feared a nightmare of "American-style litigation," with parties substi-
tuting an adversarial relationship for one previously based on non-con-
frontational negotiated settlements. Nevertheless, a clear majority of
GATT members recognized the need for greater specificity in the sub-
stantive rules of international behavior so as to bring greater certainty
in the means for resolving their disputes. The resulting codicils to the
General Agreement were remarkable in that opposition ranging from
skepticism to horror had been overcome in their adoption. The magni-
tude of this accomplishment can be measured by the fact that only one
of the proposed codes, albeit one of the most controversial, the Safe-
guards Code, was not ultimately agreed upon. 5 Thus the stage was set
for the creation of a new dispute settlement structure to adjudicate the
new corpus of international law.
The New Disputes Settlement Process
Having achieved possibly one of the hallmarks of international di-
plomacy in creating the Agreements of the Tokyo Round, the negotia-
tors seem to have been exhausted by their achievement. The provisions
for resolving disputes were modified to conform with the new codes
more as an afterthought than as an integral part of the codes them-
selves. Many of the negotiators will dispute this conclusion in view of
the hundreds of hours spent on the procedural changes, but the results
speak for themselves. The substantive improvements in the dispute set-
tlement procedures are neither as profound nor as satisfactory as the
changes in the normative trade rules embodied in the various codes.
The dispute settlement process under the GATT was the subject of
two Agreements which clarified and affirmed the customary practices
which had evolved under the traditional GATT panel procedure.' 6 In
addition, separate dispute settlement procedures were created for han-
dling disputes arising under each of the new major non-tariff codes,
each of which is juridically independent of the General Agreement.' 7
The improved procedures for dispute settlement under the General
15 H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1979).
16 Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settle-
ment, GATT Doc. MTN/FR/W/20/Rev. 2, art. XXIII:2, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra
note 5, at 641; Draft Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, GATT Doc. MTN/FR/W/20/Rev. 2, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra note 5,
at 634.
17 The relationship of the dispute settlement procedures under Article XXIII of the General
GAT7T Dispute Settlements
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Agreement were generally incorporated into the dispute settlement pro-
cedures under the separate major Tokyo Round codes.
The modifications in the dispute settlement procedures are both
explicit and illusory. Time limits have been established for both the
creation of panels and the ultimate resolution of disputes.18 Although
the time limits appear straightforward (seven days for objections to ap-
pointment of panel members; three months for final dispute resolution
in urgent cases), it is difficult to imagine that "slippage" will not occur
given the vagaries of the international civil service. Still, whether the
time limits are treated as firm deadlines or merely as guidelines, they
signal an improvement over present practice.
A "standing roster" of potential panelists is to be maintained by
the GATT Secretariat. Although an informal roster has been kept for
years, it was comprised predominantly of civil servants from Scandina-
via and Switzerland. The new rules encourage inclusion of private sec-
tor panelists, and the United States has already submitted such
names. 19 It remains to be seen, however, whether any U.S. private sec-
tor panelists will be accepted by disputants given the tradition of em-
paneling "neutral" Europeans and the almost inevitable involvement
of U.S. interests in any significant trade dispute.
The new rules also specify, in general terms, the procedures of the
panels. Although the newly codified procedural rules are vague com-
pared to the Administrative Procedure Act,20 they represent a step for-
ward as panel procedures previously often depended upon the
personalities of the panelists.
Effectiveness of the New Dispute Settlement Process
There is currently an active debate among the observers of the
GATT as to whether the new dispute settlement authority will be effec-
tive. Some international trade experts have taken the view that the To-
Agreement with those incorporated in the new non-tariff codes is still unsettled. See Graham,
Results of the Tokyo Round, 9 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 153, 171-72 (1979).
The possibility of selective accession by individual nations only to those Agreements in which
they have a special economic interest, raises the prospect of a trading world no longer strictly
divided between "developed" and "developing" countries, but characterized by a loose coalition
of small trading systems grouped around individual MTN Agreements. Graham, Revolution in
Trade Politics, 36 FoR. PoL'Y 49, 59 (Fall 1979).
18 For a detailed examination of the modifications in dispute settlement see Hudec, GAYT
Dispute Settlement After Tokyo Round- An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 146, 170-
97 (1980).
19 See ag., Solicitation of Individuals to Serve as Panelists for the GATT Dispute Settlement
Process, 45 Fed. Reg. 7362 (1980).
20 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 2:317(1980)
kyo Round provides a vital new means for resolving multilateral trade
disputes, and that even in prior years, the very existence of the GATT
and its dispute settlement authority had itself encouraged countries to
observe agreed-upon norms of trade policy.21 This school of thought
points to the new elaborate system of panel selection and procedures
and to the substantive Agreements 22 as providing both the substantive
and procedural groundwork upon which a truly effective means of in-
ternational adjudication can be based. This school suggests that coun-
tries will find it in their own interests not to reject cynically their prior
agreements under the GATT, and notes that countries have already
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the dispute settlement proc-
ess.
2 3
In contrast to this line of thought, other commentators suggest that
the new provisions are little more than windowdressing and that seri-
ous disputes will still be settled on an ad hoc basis by the parties them-
selves.24 This school of thought points to the historic trend of major
trading nations to resolve differences through informal-sometimes se-
cret-agreements when significant trading problems arise.25 This is ex-
emplified by the European-Japanese steel trade agreements, the
existence of which was not even publicly acknowledged by the parties
for years after their inception.26 These critics also note the unwilling-
ness of major Western trading nations to yield what they regard as their
own national sovereignty in determining the appropriate response to
cases of real or perceived discrimination by other countries. They cite,
for example, the Chicken War,27 in which the United States unilater-
ally retaliated against European agricultural policy with only a gesture
21 See, e.g., remarks of John H. Jackson in panel discussion, supra note 11.
22 See note 10 supra.
23 See Hudec, supra note 18, at 181-83.
24 See e.g., remarks of Thomas R. Graham in panel discussion, supra note 11; see also Herz-
stein, The Role of Law and Lawyers Under the New Multilateral Trade Agreements, 9 GA. J. INT'L
& COMp. L. 177, 196 (1979). (Lack of rules allows for ad hoe decisionmaking within dispute
settlement process itself).
25 See Graham, Revolution in Trade Politics, 36 FOR. PoL'y 49, 60-61 (Fall 1979) ("Close to 50
per cent of British imports from Japan are thought to be subject to [secret] private bilateral agree-
ments. Japan is suspected of limiting imports through more than 200 such private deals with
exporters, many of which are newly competitive LDC's. Many of these private deals are struck
between the ailing industry in the importing country (with the blessing of its government) and the
robust industry in the exporting nation: thus, they are technically untouchable by trade rules that
apply to governments only.").
26 See A. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 249 (1979).
27 See Lowenfeld, 'Doing Unto Others'.. .- The Chicken War Ten Years After, 4 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 599; 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 317 (1973, 1974); Walker, Dispute Settlement: The Chicken
War, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 671 (1964).
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at resolving the issue through the GATT. 8 In the view of this group of
observers, the "expanded" role of the GATT in settling international
disputes is one of appearance rather than substance. These observers
foresee the employment of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism
only in the most limited cases, where the critical trading interests of
neither of the parties are involved, as a mere gesture to international
comity.
These opposing perceptions of the future effectiveness of GATT
dispute settlements constitute more than a mere academic debate. The
GATT dispute settlement procedure currently in place may well gov-
ern the patterns of international trade for the next five to ten years. In
my view, neither of the above-referenced schools is entirely correct in
its analysis of the role that GATT dispute settlement will take in the
near future. Though acknowledging both the inefficacy of GATT dis-
pute settlement procedures in the past and the relative superficiality of
the changes within those procedures compared to the revisions agreed
to at Geneva in the normative rules of international trade, thoughtful
observers should, nevertheless, find reason for optimism for the future.
The new dispute settlement panel procedure should be much more ef-
fective than in the past for several reasons:
First. Panelists will have the luxury of considering issues nar-
rowly defined in terms of substantive law.29 They will not, in other
words, be charged with making broad-brush international trade policy
on each issue they decide. This should enhance the panelists' resolve to
confront difficult issues and render decisions, leading to the develop-
ment of a corpus of jurisprudence in international commerce.30
Second. As GATT members will be permitted to limit the con-
sideration of the panels, disputants no longer run the risk of having the
entire base of their domestic policy undermined by a sweeping panel
decision and thus will be more inclined to bring disputes to the settle-
ment process.
Third. The substantive specificity of the new codes and the new
procedures discouraging overly-broad rulings should improve the con-
tent of decisions. Dispute settlement panelists in the 1980's will be
called upon to resolve significant and specific questions of law. The
28 See 45 Fed. Reg. 35,057 (1980) (the legacy of the Chicken War still persists with a recent
unilateral increase in duties by the United States on truck chassis, one of the targets in the decade-
long trade war).
29 4ccord, (Conference), Reform of the International Trading System, 84 F.R.D. 590, 597
(1980) (statement of Mr. Herzstein noting increased specificity of new rules).
30 But see Id. at 598 (suggesting that the dispute resolution procedures stress conciliation
rather than adjudication, forestalling the development of a corpus of jurisprudence).
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sharper focus of investigation will permit and even require much more
discrete analysis of the facts (and "law") in individual cases.
Will the new dispute settlement panels be merely another College
of Cardinals debating esoteric questions of interpretation? I think not.
Under the new ground rules established by the Tokyo Round, panelists
will be called upon to give definitive pronouncements on the codes,
requiring of the panelists judicial, as opposed to academic, tempera-
ments and a hard-nosed practicality heretofore largely lacking in the
dispute settlement process.
Fourth. There seems to have been a recognition among GATT
members that the prior practices of asking only civil servants to sit on
GATT panels does not necessarily lend credibility to the dispute settle-
ment process. 31 Although inclusion of private-sector individuals in
GATT panels is not required by a multilateral agreement,32 it was tac-
itly recognized in Geneva that the inclusion of such persons might lend
not only credibility, but the appearance of credibility to the process
itself.
Whether the GATT dispute settlement procedure will be an effec-
tive means of adjudicating provisions of the codes adopted in Geneva
remains to be seen. A promising start, however, has been made. The
law, procedures, and even the attitudes of those affected by the new
procedures have been changed. The thoughtful observer will recognize
that the Tokyo Round has established totally new ground rules, under
which pessimistic projections of the dispute settlement system's effec-
tiveness, rooted largely on past state practice, may not validly stand.
Undoubtedly, there will be legitimate criticism of the manner in
which the codes are interpreted, as well as, perhaps, of the entire dis-
31 See Jackson, supra note 9, at 42 (panel members were usually officials who represented
governments to the GATT who, although ostensibly acting in their individual capacities, could
not be fully insulated from potential political influences of their governments' desires and poli-
cies).
32 See e.g., Draft Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement
and Surveillance, supra note 16, at para. 6 (Resolution of Disputes), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No.
153, supra note 5, at 634 ["the Director-General should maintain an informal indicative list of
governmental and non-governmental persons qualified in the fields of trade relations, economic
development, and other matters covered by the General Agreement, and who could be available
for serving on panels" (emphasis added)]; Customs Valuation Code, supra note 10, at Annex III
(Ad hoc Panels), para. 2, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra note 5, at 61 [the Chairman of the
Committee on Customs Valuation in maintaining an informal indicative list of prospective panel
members "may also include persons other than government officials" (emphasis added)]; Subsi-
dies Code, supra note 10, at pt. VI, art. 18, para. 4, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, supra note 5 at
289 ["the Chairman of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures should maintain
an informal indicative list of governmental and nongovernmental persons" (empahsis added)].
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pute settlement process. 33  Criticism of the dispute settlement proce-
dures will arise, though the effectiveness of the new dispute settlement
policy is dependent more upon the substance of the codes themselves
than on the procedures which have been adopted for dispute resolu-
tion. In the presence of structural changes that have diminished the
obstacles to truly judicial decisions, the best use of criticism, at the
present time, will be to encourage submission of disagreements to the
panels, and then to urge thoughtful analysis of the results.
U S. Private Party Access to GA TT Dispute Settlement
Although neither individual industries, labor unions, nor trade as-
sociations haveper se standing to raise issues directly in the GATT,
most GATT contracting parties have developed internal procedures by
which their own industries can request their governments to take action
in the GATT dispute process on their behalf. In the United States, the
domestic procedure under which private parties can "trigger" presiden-
tial action to enforce the rights of the United States under any trade
agreement was first outlined in the Trade Act of 1974,34 and modified
by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.11
Under section 302(a) of the amended Trade Act, an interested per-
son may file a petition with the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) requesting the President to take action under section 30136 and
setting forth allegations in support of the request.37 It is then wholly
33 See e.g., Jackson, supra note 9, at 44-46 [(1) fragmentation of dispute settlement under
several Agreements increases the danger of increased costs, complexity, and forum shopping; (2)
the ambiguous standard of "nullification or impairment" still remains in some Agreements; (3) the
panels' role of conciliation vs. adjudication remains unclear in some Agreements]; (Conference),
(statement of Mr. Herzstein), supra note 29, at 598 [(1) procedures stress conciliation rather than
adjudication; (2) stress for published written panel opinion inadequate; (3) no initiation of com-
plaints by independent bodies provided for].
34 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. III 1979).
35 19 U.S.C. § 2501 (Supp. III 1979).
36 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. 111 1979). Under section 301 the President is authorized to take
"all appropriate and feasible action within his power to enforce" U.S. rights under any trade
agreement or "to respond to any act, policy, or practice of a foreign country . . . that is (A)
inconsistent with the provisions of.. . any trade agreement, or (B) is unjustifiable, unreasonable,
or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce." Id. at § 2411(a). In addi-
tion, the President is expressly authorized to:
(1) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, or refrain from proclaiming, benefits of
trade agreement concessions to carry out a trade agreement with the foreign country or in-
strumentality involved; and (2) impose duties or other import restrictions on the services of
such foreign country or instrumentality for such time as he determines appropriate.
Id. at § 2411(b).
37 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (Supp. III 1979). For a definition of an "interested
party" and regulations promulgated by the USTR concerning the filing of petitions and the con-
duct of investigations and hearings, see 15 C.F.R. § 2006 (1980).
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within the discretion of the USTR to decide whether to initiate an in-
vestigation of the allegations.38 Under section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 there existed no time limit within which the USTR was required
to exercise his discretion,39 whereas, under section 302(a) of the
amended Act, the USTR must make a preliminary decision no later
than forty-five days after the date on which he received the petition.4
If the USTR determines that an investigation is not warranted, he
must inform the petitioner of his reasons and publish a summary of
these reasons and his decision in the FederalRegister.4 1 If, on the other
hand, the USTR determines that an investigation is in order, he must
publish the text of the petition in the Federal Register and provide op-
portunities for the presentation of views concerning the issues, includ-
ing an opportunity for a public hearing within thirty days if a hearing
was requested in the petition.42 In addition, on the same day the USTR
reaches an affirmative preliminary determination, he must request con-
sultation with the foreign country concerned.43 If the case involves
rights or benefits recognized under a trade agreement," and a resolu-
tion is not reached through consultation with the foreign country con-
cerned within the period specified in the agreement, the USTR must
"promptly request proceedings on the matter under the formal dispute
settlement procedures provided under such agreement. '45 During this
period, the USTR must seek information and advice from both the pe-
titioner and appropriate representatives of the private sector.46 The re-
38 In reporting out the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 the Senate Committee on Finance
noted:
this discretion must be exercised in light of the need to vigorously insure fair and equitable
conditions for U.S. commerce, and in cases involving the enforcement of U.S. rights under
the agreements negotiated in the [Multilateral Trade Negotiations] or where a petition has
been filed requesting a response to an action inconsistent with such agreements, this discre-
tion normally should be exercised byproceeding to investigate and to pursue valid claims in
appropriate international fora when the petition properly presents issues covered by section
301 as amended by this bill.
S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 238 (1979), reprinted in [1979] 6A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 27, 246.
39 Id. at 237.
40 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (Supp. III 1979).
41 Id. § 2412(b)(1).
42 Id. § 2412(b)(2).
43 Id. § 2413.
44 The petition procedures provided under section 302 of the Trade Act of 1974 are applicable
not only to disputes under trade agreements but also to "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discrimi-
natory activities not covered by the dispute settlement provisions of the international trade agree-
ments or the GATT but which, in fact, burden or restrict U.S. commerce." S. REP. No. 249, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. 231 (1979), reprinted in [1979] 6A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 27, 240.
45 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2413 (Supp. III 1979).
46 Section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2155(i) (Supp. III 1979), requires the
USTR to consult with the appropriate general policy advisory committees for industry, labor,
G47T Dispute Settlements
2:317(1980)
quirements of consulting with the foreign country as well as of
submitting the matter to the dispute settlement process are provisions
which were not present in the Trade Act of 1974.
On the basis of his investigation and consultations with foreign
governments, the USTR must submit a report to the President recom-
mending what action, if any, should be taken with respect to the peti-
tion. Four specific deadlines for the submission of this report are
established under section 304 of the amended Act.4 7 The Trade Act of
1974 did not contain provisions which stipulated time limits within
which the USTR was required to submit his report to the President.
Nor did the Trade Act of 1974 specify a time within which the Presi-
dent must respond. Under section 301(c)(2) of the amended Act, the
President must make a determination of what action he will take with
respect to a petition no later than twenty-one days after receiving the
USTR's recommendation. 48 Regardless of the recommendation of the
USTR, further action by the President is entirely within his discretion
under both the old Trade Act and the new Trade Agreements Act.49
As a practical matter, utilization of the GATT dispute settlement
procedure has a number of advantages for the prospective American
petitioner:
First. Trade practices of other countries, such as trade diversions,
which cannot be addressed under the traditional mechanisms of an-
tidumping, countervailing duty or "escape clause" relief, can be chal-
lenged.5 °
Second. The GATT dispute settlement process is relatively inex-
pensive compared with other forms of relief from import competition.
Most of the cost of prosecuting a GATT dispute is borne by the govern-
ment.
agriculture, and services established by the President as well as with private organizations or
groups representing labor, industry, agriculture, small business, service industries, consumer inter-
ests, and other interests.
47 19 U.S.C. § 2414 (Supp. 111 1979). The USTR must make his recommendation not later
than
(A) 7 months after the date of the initiation of the investigation. . . if the petition alleges
only an export.subsidy covered by the [Subsidies Agreement]; (B) 8 months after the date of
the investigation initiation if the petition alleges any matter covered by the Subsidies Agree-
ment other than only an export subsidy; (C) in the case of a petitioner involving a Tokyo
Round trade agreement other than the Subsidies Agreement, 30 days after the dispute settle-
ment procedure is concluded; or (D) 12 months after the date of the investigation initiation in
any case not described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
Id.
48 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
49 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 238 (1979), reprinted in [1979] 6A U.S. CODE CONo.
& AD. NEws 27, 246.
50 See note 6 supra.
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Third. Procedures adopted in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
guarantee at least a "no" or "maybe" answer within a short time after
filing a petition.
The GATT dispute settlement procedure as presently made avail-
able to American petitioners is not, however, without its problems and
practical disadvantages:
First. The disposition of petitions by the USTR is without sub-
stantive review, and, as such, is discretionary. Although the current
law provides the appearance of administrative regularity, so as to limit
potential abuses of executive discretion, it is an elaborate gossamer cur-
tain. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 established deadlines within
which the USTR must initially decide whether to act on a request by
adversely affected domestic petitioners; it did not, however, establish
statutory criteria as to when, given certain facts, the USTR must bring
a particular complaint to the GATT dispute settlement process. The
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 merely removed one of the means by
which the USTR could kill a proceeding by doing nothing at all. The
deadlines, the USTR's decision, and appeals from his decision, are pro-
cedural rather than substantive safeguards.
Second. A domestic petitioner is now guaranteed he will be told
early in the process that no action will be taken by the USTR, but the
petitioner has no assurance at all with regard to the type of relief he can
expect if the USTR decides to initiate an investigation. Unlike an-
tidumping or countervailing duty proceedings, no particular remedy is
specified either in U.S. law or in the GATT. Under current procedures,
the U.S. government has virtually unquestioned authority to negotiate
the relief it deems best, without consulting with the affected domestic
industry. Furthermore, if dispute settlement fails, economic retaliation
against the offending country may be in areas totally unrelated to the
injured domestic industry. Although procedural regularity in initiating
complaints with the USTR is a step forward, lack of certainty as to the
remedy ultimately available renders it a hollow promise.
This result is not altogether unjustifiable, and indeed, was explic-
itly contemplated by the framers of the 1979 Act. To constrict execu-
tive branch discretion with regard to the enforcement of U.S. trade
rights would have been to deny the fact that international trade conflict
resolution is a matter of negotiation. The law purposely did not bind
the government to guarantee an outcome of negotiations; such a course
would have been manifestly ridiculous.
Executive branch discretion in the enforcement of U.S. interna-
tional trade rights is not and should not be absolute, however, and it is
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clear that Congress, in the 1979 Trade Agreements Act, rejected such a
notion. For too long, American workers and industries adversely af-
fected by unfair foreign business practices had been given short shrift
by various Administrations, for reasons wholly unrelated to the merits
of the claims contained in import relief petitions. In the areas of an-
tidumping and countervailing duties, in particular, the rules have been
tightened to limit the discretionary authority of the executive branch in
settling or even ignoring claims brought by American producers and
workers.51 In these areas, domestic petitioners were given rights of ju-
dicial review, and the administering authorities were severely restricted
in their ability to "settle" cases on terms less than those specified in the
statutes. In my view, these types of restrictions, particularly in the cases
of internationally acknowledged unfair trade practices, are not only de-
sirable, but necessary.
In the case of actions brought under section 302, however, the is-
sues are much less clear. The types of practices which can be com-
plained of and brought before the central GATT disputes settlement
panel, are much less clear-cut than those subject to the International
Antidumping Code,52 or the Code on Countervailing Measures. 53 The
contracting parties both implicitly and explicitly agreed to submit these
unique questions to an international tribunal, rather than unilaterally
to resolve them in their own judicial systems. To require by particular
domestic legislation a specific outcome of a negotiation would be a re-
pudiation of our international agreements.
This is not to suggest that additional strictures on the ability of our
government to ignore complaints brought under section 302 would not
be desirable.54 While the United States should not seek to insist on
particular results from international tribunals before cases are even
brought before such panels, it can and should give the broadest possi-
ble rights to domestic petitioners to participate in the dispute settlement
process. Neither the GATT dispute settlement procedures nor applica-
ble U.S. law directly recognize the right of private parties to participate
directly in the international dispute settlement process. In this regard,
51 See generally Comment, The New Antidumping Procedures of the Trade Agreements Act of
1979: Does it Create a NAon-tariffBarrier?, 2 Nw. J. INT"L L. & Bus. 200 (1980).
52 International Antidumping Code, note 10 supra.
53 Subsidies Code, note 10 supra.
54 Although some procedural tinkering may be required in the sections 301-302 provisions,
substantive requirements will be much more difficult to obtain. The primary reason for the diffi-
culty of obtaining substantive requirements is that our prior agreements under the Subsidies Code
have severely limited future substantive adjustments in the sections 301-302 provisions absent
fresh international negotiations.
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significant questions of due process and the right to representations by
counsel remain unanswered. As one commentator recently and point-
edly inquired.
[1.] To what extent will private lawyers for the affected business inter-
ests on both sides be allowed to participate in the proceedings?
[2.] Will they be permitted to work along with the officials of the United
States government and the foreign government, who are acting for their
countries in the proceedings?
[3.] Will all the pertinent information possessed by the government be
made available to them?
[4.] Will they be consulted on the factual evidence and length of argu-
ment to be presented?
[5.] Will they be allowed to present to the international forum, perhaps
through their government channels, evidence and arguments of their own
in addition to those presented by the government?
55
It is clear that many American industries have been discouraged
from relying on the current sections 301-302 procedures because they
are totally at the mercy of U.S. trade negotiators not fully cognizant of
the economic factors involved in trade of an industry's particular com-
modity. The United States should seek to encourage and institutional-
ize participation by private parties, both on a domestic and
international level, in the dispute settlement process, amending both
the Trade Act and the GATT to permit such direct representation.
Participation by private parties may not guarantee the outcome of in-
ternational trade dispute settlements as desired by the domestic indus-
try. Nonetheless, some benefit would derive from USTR decisions no
longer being made in a vacuum, divorced from the needs of the affected
industry. Should the mere participation of counsel for domestic peti-
tioners in the decisional process be found inadequate to provide the
requisite "backbone" for the USTR, then additional, more severe re-
strictions should be placed upon the USTR's negotiating authority.
Third. As a practical matter, filing a section 302 petition can
prejudice chances of prevailing in a pending "escape clause" action, or
55 Herzstein, supra note 24, at 201. In regard to Herzstein's third inquiry, under section 305 of
the amended Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2415 (Supp. III 1979), the USTR must disclose upon receipt
of a written request all nonconfidential information available to the USTR or other federal agen-
cies concerning the nature and extent of a specific trade policy or practice of a foreign government
with respect to particular merchandise. Private parties may also request information concerning
U.S. rights under any trade agreement and the remedies which may be available under that agree-
ment and U.S. law, and information concerning past and present domestic and international pro-
ceedings or actions with respect to the policy or practice concerned. The purpose of the disclosure
provision is to aid private parties in deciding whether to initiate section 302 proceedings. S. REP.




in even such apparently legalistic remedies as section 337, antidumping
or countervailing duty relief.
The sections 301-302 rules are so new, vague and uncertain that
domestic firms and labor unions have generally opted for the more le-
galistic forms of relief.5 6 Since the GATT method is intensely political,
however, prospective domestic petitioners should discuss their options
with the USTR before making a final decision about the most appro-
priate avenue of relief.
In sum, it is still too early to tell whether the GATT dispute settle-
ment procedures adopted in the Tokyo Round will answer the criti-
cisms previously leveled at the mechanism. Although American
petitioners are denied direct access to the GATT dispute settlement
process, they can obtain some of its protection. The degree to which
they are successful, however, rests almost exclusively upon the USTR's
willingness and ability to prosecute aggressively these complaints. It
appears desirable, therefore, that greater and more direct access be
given to American petitioners than appears to be the case under current
law. Until there is more domestic and international experience under
this regime, however, proponents of the new GATT dispute settlement
practice cannot brag and cynics cannot gloat.
56 Approximately 25 cases have been brought under section 301 of the Trade Act and its
predecessor statutes. Herzstein, supra note 24, at 183.
